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A DIALOGUE ON STRATEGY

On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means
Gregory D. Miller, Chris Rogers, Francis J. H. Park,
William F. Owen, and Jeffrey W. Meiser

ABSTRACT: This dialogue regarding teaching, understanding, and
practicing strategy stems from Jeffrey W. Meiser’s article “Ends +
Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy” published in the Winter 2016–17
issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

The Value of a Model. Gregory D. Miller and Chris Rogers
Like Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser, we are frustrated by the formulaic
ends, ways, and means model commonly equated with strategy. We
acknowledge the handicap created by the lack of a common definition
of strategy, and recognize the need for one that does not exclusively rely
on a formula but also effectively incorporates the interests and decisions
of other actors—allies, adversaries, and neutral states alike. Yet, we
were profoundly disappointed in Meiser’s criticism, which appeared to
diminish not only the Department of Defense’s approach to strategy but
also how strategy is taught.
We assume Meiser understands models merely simplify reality and
are never intended for literal use; they only provide a starting point to
develop skilled practitioners who can wisely deviate from them. From
Meiser’s perspective, a dangerous impression might develop of American
profesional military education churning out automatons incapable of
critical, much less creative, thinking, who simply rely on a formula to
develop and implement strategy. We think Parameters’ readers will be
encouraged by the fact that Defense Department programs actually
expose senior military officers to a number of strategic models and
require critical analysis of such fundamentals.
At the National Defense University’s Joint Advanced Warfighting
School curriculum, no single definition is taught as the “right answer”
and no specific model of strategy is the “right approach.” Future
practitioners are not only required to articulate their own definitions
and models but also to justify when, how, and why they deviate from
or improve upon existing models. Thus, the curriculum incorporates
complexity and design thinking, both of which challenge conventional
approaches to solving problems, especially complex problems, which
would include nearly all national security decisions.
Consequently, senior US military officers and their equivalent
civilian counterparts who complete this and similar programs are more
than capable of moving beyond simple formulas when advising senior
leaders. This is true precisely because these students do not rely on
simple constructs of ends, ways, and means when developing theater
strategies and theater campaign plans. Moreover, these professionals
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understand the nuances of incorporating a whole-of-government
approach (interagency collaboration) and of applying instruments of
national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement tools), which Meiser mistakenly treats
synonymously. With this understanding, strategy practitioners recognize
the military frequently does not want to address problems outside its
expertise, even though its capabilities and capacities often result in it
being tasked to “do something.”
In closing, students should never be told they can solve the world’s
problems by checking all the boxes. Instead, students should learn
complex problems rarely have simple solutions because of second- and
third-order consequences and the competing interests arising from
other actors’ cultures, histories, and principles. At best, a strategist’s
efforts can help mitigate confl ict or produce more favorable outcomes.

Where Are Policy and Risk? Francis J. H. Park
While I agree in principle with the flaws Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser
identifies in the practice of strategy, his analysis omits the roles of
policy and risk as critical elements influencing strategy. The relationship
between ends, ways, and means had been part of the US Army War
College curriculum for some eight years when it appeared in Military
Review (1989). Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of strategy originally
appeared in Military Strateg y: Theory and Application, a US Army War
College student text he edited from 1981 to 1994. Lykke’s model bears
influence by contemporaries such as Colonel Harry A. Summers Jr.
whose work on the Army’s Vietnam Lessons Learned project eventually
bore fruit as On Strateg y (1982).
While Lykke articulated strategy in the form of an equation, only
the most mechanistic application of the model would suggest that
the formulation of strategy is merely a balancing act of ends, ways,
and means. In practice, strategists consider other factors such as policy,
which is conspicuously absent from Meiser’s analysis. Lykke warns
that military strategy “must support national strategy and comply with
national policy.” This interplay between policy and strategy is essential
because policy outlines the bounds of what strategy should attain
while strategy identifies the costs of policy’s goals. Although military
strategists can influence policy, as Eliot Cohen so notes, it is inherently
an unequal dialogue.
Risk, which receives only passing mention in Meiser’s article, is the
most important product of the dialogue between policy and strategy.
The current risk assessment methodology from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff manual 3105.01, Joint Risk Assessment, describes risk simply as “the
probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something
valued.” In practice, risk is the ultimate expression of a strategy’s
feasibility and not something that is quantitatively derived from an
imbalance of ends, ways, and means.
In Afghanistan, coalition forces and their Afghan partners still
had to secure areas and their populations while buying time to build
the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and Afghan
civil institutions—a Herculean task requiring functions and resources
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not available in any reasonable capacity within the Department of
Defense. None of those considerations would have been apparent in an
equation consisting solely of ends, ways, and means. Those charged with
crafting policy may not have had discussions in such terms, but those
charged with developing strategy, both inside and outside the Defense
Department, certainly did. The policy constraints and the realities of
the environment did not impede critical and creative thinking. But,
any nontraditional approach would have incurred considerable, if not
unacceptable, political and strategic risk.
Traditional views of war—divided into strategy, operational art, and
tactics in many military discussions—tend to glide over discussions of
policy; however, strategy is inherently incomplete without policy and its
interactions. The current definition of strategy certainly runs the hazard
of ham-fisted execution by unskilled practitioners who might construe
strategic ends as full stops. Nonetheless, a new definition of strategy is
not required; but as Professor Meiser so notes, a good strategy is.

Strategy Is Not a Sum. William F. Owen
Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser correctly suggests the Lykke model is flawed.
A poor model based on a widely known fallacy, its adoption was and is
symptomatic of a failure to understand extant strategic theory stemming
from an incorrect description of strategy equaling ends, ways, and
means. Lykke, and those who saw merit in his model, either did not read
or did not understand Clausewitz. Otherwise, they would have likewise
framed ends as the policy objectives (the desired behavior or condition),
means as combat (the acts of violence designed to overthrow the violent
objector), and ways as the link between the two. In short, as Clausewitz
stated, strategy is the “use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”
When Meiser referenced the dysfunction highlighted in the 2009
Afghanistan policy review, his failure to recognize nation-states’
successful application of “strategy” accomplished as a campaign within
a theater becomes evident. Nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and even the Irish
Republican Army, employ the same model with only a slight variation.
Simply put, strategy in Afghanistan—or anywhere else—is the link
of tactical action to policy objectives, and those objectives should be
achievable with the removal of the armed objector. As Clausewitz clearly
warned, if that is not the case, one should not be using violence to attain
the policy. Violence is the means that makes strategy unique. Thus, the
whole-of-government approach Meiser referred to attempts to describe
a process that aligns tactical means with policy objectives.
To conclude, Lykke’s model remains incorrect within the framework
of classical strategic theory and has never had the utility ascribed to it.
Strategy is not the sum of ends, ways, and means: rather, ways is strategy,
ends is policy, and the means is combat. That the article did not point
out this principle is as alarming for obvious reasons as is the fallacious
implication that English-speaking militaries do not have adequate
strategic theories to formulate successful strategy. Highly practical and
effective strategic theory exists. But, the confusion demonstrated in the
article is simply the product of a choice to ignore it.
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In Response. Jeﬀrey W. Meiser
“Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy” was written to add clarity
to the broad conversation about strategy. I was disappointed with the
existing definitions of strategy as being either too narrow and confining
or too broad, inclusive, and vague. Both approaches tend to produce
bad strategy either by eliminating creative and adaptive thinking or by
encouraging the reproduction of vacuous generalities.
After conversing with scholars and practitioners, researching, and
teaching over several years, I settled on the definition for strategy: a
theory of success. This definition is based on the writings of Barry R.
Posen and Eliot A. Cohen, but influenced by a broad range of scholars
including Richard P. Rumelt at UCLA Business School, Hal Brands at
Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Sir Lawrence Freedman at Kings College,
among others. My goal is to develop a definition that can fit all contexts
in which strategy is relevant, including business strategy, grand strategy,
and military strategy.
My article focused on military strategy because I see significant
problems in US military strategy, including how it is taught in US
military institutions, how it is discussed in the English-speaking defense
community, and how it is implemented within the US government. It
is a great honor and privilege to have this opportunity to respond to
three thoughtful and well-articulated critiques of my essay. I thank Dr.
Gregory D. Miller, Colonel Chris Rogers, Colonel Francis J. H. Park,
and Mr. William F. Owen for taking my article seriously enough to
write responses.

Defining Strategy

The only point of consensus among the commentators is that Arthur
Lykke’s formula of ends + ways + means = strategy is an inadequate
definition of strategy. Owen takes the strongest position, arguing that
Lykke’s approach never had any utility and is profoundly misguided.
Miller and Rogers see some value in Lykke’s approach, but agree that
it should not be rigidly applied and must be supplemented by other
concepts, definitions, and approaches. This consensus is important.
Anyone relying only or primarily on Lykke’s formula should reconsider
whether he or she is taking into account the complexity of the world as
well as the intense and difficult task of being an adaptive, critical, and
creative thinker.
Agreeing on what strategy is not, the contributors disagree on how
strategy should be defined. The general definition for strategy proposed
in the article is derived from the strategy literature, but refined to focus
on what strategy is as a distinctive concept applicable across domains
and disciplines. Only one of the commentaries actually proposes a rival
definition for strategy: Owen endorses Carl von Clausewitz’s definition
of strategy as the “use of engagements for the purpose of the war.” This
definition is so narrow that even if we think only in terms of military
strategy, it is not very useful. Furthermore, in this statement, Clausewitz
does not tell us what strategy is, he tells us what to do with it. I would be
relatively happy with a definition of military strategy stated as “a theory
of the use of engagements for the purpose of war.”
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It is quite common to refer to means as resources, as Lykke did and
many others continue to do. In some contexts, means is synonymous with
method, (e.g., the ends justify the means); however, it is not appropriate to
assert that combat is the only possible means relevant to strategy. Finally,
strategy can be applied to a wide variety of circumstances expanding well
beyond a specific military campaign within a given theater of operations.
Overall, Owen’s rigid, narrow reading of Clausewitz is not
consistent with contemporary discourse in the English-speaking
defense community even though the call to rethink our concepts in a
more Clausewitzian framework is well taken and deserves additional
consideration. Returning to On War is never a bad idea.

Strategy, Policy, and Risk

Whereas Owen wants to define strategy narrowly, Park argues it
must be broadened to include policy and perhaps risk. I agree strategy is
influenced by policy, it could hardly be otherwise; however, as I note in
“Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” strategy should have a clear
definition that does not include other phenomena. An overinclusive
definition distracts from the core purpose of strategy—articulating
exactly how we will achieve our goal. Policy should also have a distinct
definition. Once clear and distinct definitions are established, it is
possible to discuss how the concepts relate to one another.
Let us accept for the moment the definition of strategy as a theory
of success and use Park’s definition of policy as a statement of “what
strategy is to attain.” These definitions tell us that policy defines the
nature of success; policy tells us what we are trying to cause with the
actions we take. Strategy tell us how we will achieve the stated policy.
Therefore, we have a tight linkage between strategy and policy after
we define them as distinct concepts. Just because two concepts are
related does not mean they cannot have distinct definitions; instead,
distinct definitions are essential to forming a clear understanding of
each concept’s role and exactly how they relate to one another.
Park also notes the importance of risk as “the ultimate expression
of the feasibility of a strategy.” I do not object, except to propose a
more cost-benefit expression of feasibility. An action may be likely to
cause harm to me, but it may also be likely to result in major benefits or
to disproportionate harm to my opponent. Risk is another important
concept, but again, it is different from strategy even if it is a necessary
component to strategic planning and assessment.
Park concludes by noting the need for good strategy, but not a new
definition of strategy. It is not clear whether this is an endorsement of
Lykke’s definition of strategy or not. If it is, Park does not tell us why or
how my critique is wrong or why he thinks my proposed Posen-Cohen
model is misguided. I am interested in hearing his position on this point.

On Models

Miller and Rogers describe a fine institution and show an admirable
awareness of the broad range of issues relevant to teaching strategy in
a very compressed time frame. Though I asserted that Lykke’s model
of strategy is influential in the broad US defense community, my intent
was not to make an inclusive critique of the US defense community.
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Programs and individuals relying solely or primarily on Lykke’s formula
should feel defensive after reading my article, but those who do not,
should not.
As a general note of caution for instructors, educators have a hard
time seeing the curriculum as students see it. A wise mentor once told
me, it is not what you can teach, it is what the student can learn. This
phenomenon can be a particularly thorny problem for 10-month long
master’s degree programs where the curriculum can easily become more
about what can be taught and less about what the students can learn.
When students and teachers are drowning in material, they sometimes
grab onto whatever is easiest to comprehend, such as an easily articulated
formula for strategy.
Agreement on a simple, distinctive definition of strategy will
improve intellectual discourse on strategy in the defense community,
the strategy-making process within the US government, and crossdisciplinary dialogue on the application of strategy application. I suggest
the definition “strategy is a theory of success.” The point is not to insist
on absolute conformity. Thinking of strategy as a theory, logic, narrative
about the future, or argument are all productive because they allow
sufficient room for creative thinking while grounding us in the basic
understanding of strategy as pushing us to think about how our actions
are going to cause the future outcome we desire.
I commend Parameters for publishing these comments and enabling
this dialogue, which I hope continues.
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